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Abstract:  Corporate governance system is of great importance in the performance of 
corporations through connection the interests of investors and managers. The 
efficiency of the corporate governance determines whether the value of firms can be 
improved. According to this, every country is finding the suitable model which can 
improve the performance of corporations efficiently. During this process, two models 
formed: the ‘outsider’ system and the ‘insider’ system. It is commonly believed that 
different country has different backgrounds of historical, economic, political, cultural, 
legal system, and basically the different structures of corporations based on which 
corresponding corporate governance systems are shaped. 2  According to the 
differences among these crucial elements, the standards of the efficient corporate 
governance system in different countries are distinctive too. So, there cannot be ‘one 
best standard system’ which is suitable for every country, and the argument for 
harmonization of corporate governance at the world level is weak. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance system plays a big role in the performance of companies. It is no denying that, 
almost all modern companies are constituted by investors and managers, and the problem of how to 
bring the interests of these two parties into line and make sure that companies are run for the benefit of 
investors is decided by corporate governance.3   
Nowadays, because of the globalization and development of international market, every country is 
forced to inquire a ‘most efficient corporate governance system’. And through the effort of some 
countries and organizations, fruitions in terms of harmonization have been achieved. For example, the 
‘Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’ (OECD) which is the first action of 
harmonization as well as several company law directives published by EU. However, two most common 
systems in the world are the ‘insider’ system which is oriented in Germany and the ‘outsider’ system 
which is applied in the United States and the U.K.4  Different country has different backgrounds of 
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historical, economic, political, cultural, legal system, and basically the different structures of 
corporations based on which corresponding corporate governance systems are shaped.5 According to 
these differences, the standards of the efficient corporate governance system in different countries are 
distinctive too. So, there cannot be ‘one best standard system’ suitable for every country, and the 
argument for harmonization of corporate governance at the world level is weak. 
This paper argues that although several countries and organizations are trying to harmonize the world 
corporate governance systems, the result will be clearly frustrated. And what should be done is leaving 
countries within competition to modify their governance system according to their characters, so that to 
enhance the efficiency of existing systems. Part II introduces some achievements of the harmonization, 
and analyses their self-contradiction. Part III examines that is one system really better than the other? 
Part IV explores how specific system formed and persisted. Part V explains the reason of persistence 
essentially in the view of beneficiaries. Part VI tests the possibility of a perfect system holding the 
advantages of both current systems.  
 
2.   ACHIEVEMENTS OF HARMONIZATION AND ITS INTERNAL 
CONTRADICTION 
 
According to these stresses from the globalization and the development of international capital market, 
some countries have adjusted their systems to some extent. For example, firms in the U.S. start to adopt 
long-term relational investing strategies which are taken from ‘insider’ system, and institutional 
investors are more common than before.6 Meanwhile, the representative of ‘insider’ system—Japan has 
some movements too. The information related to finance and investor is becoming more disclosed in 
Japan, which has been the character of ‘outsider’ system. And the financial way is becoming variable 
including equity market instead of the exclusive banking financial system. Shareholders in Japan have 
got more power. On the other hand, managers’ performance is more accountable compared with that in 
the past.7 However, it doesn’t mean these two systems will become convergent in the future, because the 
roots of them are not changed.   
Regard the action of international organizations. The OECD acts as the first harmonization,8 
produced the ‘Principles of Corporate Governance (2004)' aim to promote good corporate governance in 
general.9 These principles are efficient in theory, ensuring the basis for an efficient corporate governance 
framework, standardizing the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions, acquiring the 
equitable treatment of shareholders, emphasizing the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, 
meanwhile, demanding disclosure and transparency and making sure the responsibilities of the board.10 
To monitor how countries’ governance systems adhere to these principles, the World Bank becomes the 
monitoring institution through the ‘Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes’ (ROSC).11 
However, member states of OECD are not complied to follow these principles, so they might opt out of 
these principles in terms of their particular efficiency of existing systems.  
Compared with OECD, EU has issued some specific schemes. It has produced several company law 
directives to rule relevant issues of corporate governance.12 However, not every directive is successful. 
The 5th directive is an example,13 for which the U.K. refused the extended German-style codetermination, 
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namely, the two-tier board.14 Because the U.K. takes the one-tier board, so the firms are run for the 
shareholders’ benefit at all. If employees come into the board, the purpose of maximizing shareholders’ 
interests might be limited by the intention to balance the interests, so that distort the objective of 
corporate governance in the U.K. The similar conflict arises in 2001 European Company Statute which 
allows the creation of European Company.15 In the process of ruling the structure of this company, 
Germany requires same level of employee participation in EU companies which point the U.K. would 
never agree. Because that the market plays the most important role in monitoring managers’ performance 
not the employees under the U.K. system, so that the managers in the U.K. companies enjoy utmost 
power of management, and they would not permit employees coming into the board to limit their 
discretion.16  
Obviously, through the effort of both countries and international organizations, there are some 
achievements in harmonization. However, because of the corporate governance is based on the 
combination of several systems such as economical, political, legal system, so that every country has 
particular system framework within which the efficient modification could be made. Therefore, the 
harmonization just can be done on the face of each system, provided not interpret the root of particular 
system, otherwise, the convergence would be self-contradiction. 
 
3.  IS ANY SYSTEM SUPERIOR? –COULD THE MERITS OF THE TWO 
SYSTEMS BE COMPARED? 
 
Through the development of international capital and product market, the advantages and disadvantages 
of existing corporate governance systems become distinct. As a result, the action toward harmonization 
is taken in some areas, for example, the ‘Directive on Shareholder Rights (2007)’ and the ‘draft fifth 
directive--on Employee participation’ of the EU. Obviously, these two directives are mostly based on the 
U.K. law and the German law respectively. However, the framework and the background of these two 
systems are distinctive, so, one question should be asked, ‘Is one system really better than the other?’ 
Presently, the radical difference of the ownership of firms leads to the diverse corporate governance 
systems. General Electric, AT&T, Exxon which are the three most valuable companies in the U.S (the 
‘outsider’ system) are all widely held by public shareholders.17 On the other hand, most of German firms 
have blockholders. For example, Allianz Insurance which is the most valuable company in Germany has 
plenty of large shareholders, and the largest one own 25 percent stake being the ultimate owner of the 
company.18 The another example is Daimler Benz, the fourth largest company of Germany which is held 
by the Deutsche Bank ( 24.4 percent stake). Evidently, banks play a big role in the ownership of firms in 
Germany. Consequently, particular ownership leads to a relevant focus of the corporate governance, so 
the measure of the economic efficiency refer to different focuses is different.19 Considering diffused 
ownership of firms, the U.S. corporate governance pays a lot of attention to the free market to monitor 
the management.20  Nevertheless, the German system as well as Japanese system focuses on the 
relationship through which the long-term exchanges between owners and managers are built.21 Each 
system is pursuing different economic efficiency under its own focus.  
The differences of the focuses between current systems were set down at the beginning of the 
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industrial revolution. The U.K. is the earliest country to industrialize, so that it had enough time to 
develop firms gradually and allowed the free trade with strong economy and industry. However, 
Germany as well as Japan came into the process of industrialization later. Therefore they were dropped 
behind by the U.K. at the scratch line. Because of the weak economic basis, the firms had no choice but 
to face the fierce competition assisted by the government’s financial support and guidance. Then the 
distinctive systems formed in different countries, and they have different priorities when come across 
problems.22  In other words, different systems hold different objectives. The U.S. system aims to 
maximize shareholders’ interests (eg. good minority shareholder protection), the German system acts in 
the purpose of improving national interest (eg. the bank-central economic system) and the Japanese 
system is willing to balance the social interests in all (eg. lifetime employment).23 Relevant systems are 
developed to fulfill these objectives. From this point, the merits of current two systems cannot be 
compared.  
The proponents of the harmonization might argue that even if the objectives of two systems are 
different, according to competition countries would like to run its companies under an economic more 
efficient system. It means that the winner is the one which is more efficient in terms of economy.  
Incontestably, each system has its superiorities and defects. First of all, the ‘insider’ system 
emphasizes the stability. Compared with ‘outsider’ system, it may be slow in reaction to the change in 
the market, consequently lose some opportunities to get benefit. Take the General Motors for example, 
‘during the reign of Robert stempel lost over $13 billion before its board and institutional owners reacted 
by deposing him as CEO. And the similar problems are faced by Apple computer, Eastman Kodak.’24 
The ‘insider’ system might earn less than ‘outsider’ system, however, because of its large shareholders’ 
activity to monitor the performance of managers, the problem of free-rider of corporate control may be 
avoided, so that the company saves a mount of money.25 Meanwhile, when the company comes across 
the economic distress, the financial institutions such as banks will play a big role in restructuring this 
company so that the financial distress is less costly.26 Secondly, the ‘insider’ system may lack of 
professional managers compared with ‘outsider’ system. However, it reduces the agency costs of both 
debt financing and equity financing because of the creditor-shareholders’ (banks and other economic 
institutions) active participation in corporate governance.27 Thirdly, there is a potential problem in the 
‘insider’ system that the concentrated owners may act just for their own interest without caring about the 
interests of other investors.28 In fact, the system itself has the ability to restrict this risk through the 
commitment. Suppose that the large shareholder acts just for his own interest and lead to the suffering of 
stakeholders, he may lose the reputation in the system, so that it will be really hard for him to establish a 
long-term relationship with others.29  
The ‘outsider’ system represents the advantages of flexibility.30 It changes quickly refer to the market. 
So, this system encourages corporate governance to react rapidly to the new opportunities.31 Under this 
system, on the one hand, the ownership and control are separated, so that more professional managers 
who can make the right decision in the market are required to run the company on the behalf of owners. 
However, though these competent managers may get more benefit for the company, the agency costs 
become higher at the same time. On the other hand, although the market assisted by several professional 
institutions such as audit and account institutions monitor the performance of the managers. However, 
the market and these institutions provide no rapid way to solve the financial distress when managers 
made mistake, so the costs for restructuring the poorly performing company is much higher than 
‘insider’ system.  
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From the analysis above, both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ systems have defects, so the economic 
efficiency is almost the same after the offset of inputs and costs. The best examples are the U.K and 
Germany which are representatives of two systems respectively, and the economic performance of 
whom are similar.32 Meanwhile, each system has its particular way to proceed with the corporate 
governance, the ‘outsider’ system put the market at the central position in monitoring the performance of 
management, however, Germany emphasizes the role of large shareholders, and the final results are 
similar.  
In sum, neither system provides perfect mechanisms to solve all the problems connected with 
corporate governance. However, each one acts efficiently under its framework, so that the efficient 
results are achieved by both of them through the working of the whole system. Their merits cannot be 
compared.  
 
4.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS A CONSECUTIVE AND 
INTERACTIONAL SYSTEM----THE PIECE-MEAL CHANGE IS 
IMPOSSIBLE 
 
To some extent, corporate governance just likes a person who cannot live alone. His personality and 
habit are constructed in the period of his life and the relationship with others supports him solving 
problems or making progress. Equally, the corporate governance system is confined by its historical slot 
and evaluates in connection with the other systems such as legal, political systems and other aspects of 
the economy under particular framework.33 It is one of the elements under the framework, and the only 
way to get efficient reform is to modify the whole system and the relevant framework all together. So, the 
crucial question is that even if there is a best model, could the system be reformed toward it 
constitutionally? The answer is absolutely ‘no’ according to the path dependence and the 
complementarities. 
 
4.1  Path dependence----the scope of changes is restricted by original choices 
The persistence of particular corporate governance system is due to the distinctive ownership of 
companies, the different politics, culture, legal systems which formed in the process of original 
development of corporate governance systems.34 They are and will continue to impede the convergence 
of existing corporate governance systems.  
 
4.2  Original ownership structure of corporations decides the ownership in future 
As what have been discussed in section III: each corporate governance system is efficient to the 
particular country. Meanwhile, the massive post-war state ownership around the world leads to the 
appearance of the state controller in several countries, such as China, Austia and Singapore.35 In a word, 
it is the difference between the diffused ownership and the concentrated ownership. This basic difference 
of corporate structure makes the path of each system distinctive.  
There are several reasons that the original ownership structure affects the structure continuously. On 
the one hand, to make the structure work efficiently, relevant rules and regulations would be produced to 
assist it. For example, in a country with concentrated ownership, the regulations to avoid the self-interest 
activity of large shareholders might be made, and corresponding framework which allows the 
establishment of long-term relationship between financial institutions and firms is constructed. However, 
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in the country with diffuse ownership, to incent the managers do due diligence, a compensation scheme 
which connect the performance of firm with executive remuneration should be developed. And relevant 
rules formed to reduce agency costs. 36  Obviously, if the country wants to change its corporate 
governance structure, all of the relevant adaptations should be reformed, because the current rules are 
developed on the basis of original structure.37 So, costs of reforming might be huge even exceed the 
benefit it will make, then current system persist according to the costs. On the other hand, at the 
beginning of the development of corporate governance, most companies adopted the original structure 
which was efficient to them at that particular time. So a new company is set up in the circumstance where 
most of other accompaniers are run in that structure. It is said that the new company has no choice other 
than taking the same structure to get into the market.38 In addition, when a corporate ownership structure 
was decided, other elements in the economic system would develop in connection with the improvement 
of the corporate governance’s efficiency under this structure. Therefore, the original structure is the only 
efficient choice according to these assistances.39 In other words, it is the problem of complementarities. 
In the end, considering the efficient performance of existing systems, and the transaction from one 
system to the other must involve costs, the country would prefer to maintain the current structure.40  
 
4.3  Original legal system determines consequent legal rules 
Mr E Berglof stated, ‘The higher concentration of ownership, the smaller and less liquid capital markets, 
the difference functioning of markets for corporate control and the different nature of conflicts between 
investors would all be explained by the original decision to adopt, or impose, a specific legal system.’41 
On the other hand, Mr Coffee held that ‘share ownership patterns determine whether a country is likely 
to offer significant protection to outside investors.’42 It is clear that the structure of corporate and the 
legal system supplement each other. Because of the persistence of ownership structure, the legal system 
will follow the path too.  
Anglo-American corporate law is constructed under the principles of common law and equity law, so, 
it pays a lot of attention to the protection of justice and equity. Consequently, to maintain the equity 
among shareholders and the ownership structure, this legal system provides better preservation to 
minority shareholders. 43  Nevertheless, the civil law aims to provide stable control for the large 
shareholders on the corporate, so its corporate law follows a path of tight control with poor protection for 
minority shareholders.44 Therefore, common law system is more attractive to minority shareholders to 
invest. However, large shareholders’ controlling position is maintained well under civil law system. 
Therefore, different ownership structure is connected with different legal systems. As a survey of the 
corporate governance literature by Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny argues ‘in the absence of well 
functioning corporate law, concentration of ownership is the only way to commit not to steal from the 
company.’45  
When the country chose one of the legal systems, the path of the rules was determined. First of all, 
under the common law system, the interests of minority shareholders are preserved well, so that 
managers are enjoy the controlling power and more political power.46 They would influence the making 
of relevant corporate rules to retain their positions. The same situation exists in civil law countries, in 
which the large shareholders would utilize their political power to enhance relevant rules.47 Then the 
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original legal systems continue to exist. Secondly, new investments are unavoidable if a country wants to 
change its corporate rules. It is clear that the corporate rules work with the assistant practices and 
institutions which fit these rules well. So, the change of existing rules will go hand in hand with the 
developing of new practices and institutions. Considering these costs, the efficient rules for a country 
might rest with the current one.48 Anyhow, the original legal system formed a path which the subsequent 
corporate rules have to follow.  
 
4.4  Original financing measure influences the development of corporate 
governance 
Although, the financing measure is determined by the corporate structure, however, it is counteractive to 
the corporate governance system.  
In the ‘insider’ system, banks are in the central position of financing, so that the controllers do not 
need to sell their equity to raise funds. Therefore, the protection of minority shareholders is less 
important in this system. However, the ‘outsider’ system relies on the equity market to finance 
companies, so that the founders have to put equities into the market to raise funds. To attract public funds, 
the protection of minority shareholders becomes essential.49 Visibly, particular financing way just 
accelerates relevant rules which would enhance its ability of raising funds. There is no opportunity for 
irrelevant rules to develop. Accordingly, this original financing measure is stable. If the financing way is 
unaltered, how could relevant governance system change?  
In addition to the above three points, different countries have their historical reasons which lead to 
the particular paths. The first example is Japan, where the ‘lifetime employment’ marks a particular 
corporate governance system.50 This structure formed according to the dismission of a large number of 
employees to get the control back to firms before the Second World War. To some extent, it was the only 
way to retain the loyalty of the remaining employees and avoid them jumped from firm to firm.51 So, this 
distinctive path which was ‘a key part of the Japanese peace predicate’52 formed and maintained in Japan 
till now. In Germany, because of the conventional emphasis placed on the stakeholders, there was a 
requirement to balance the power of blockholders with stakeholders in the enterprises.53 Meanwhile, 
labor organization was always powerful, so the system of codetermination formed with a supervisory 
board in which half of the members are labors.54 Afterward, the corporate governance system developed 
following this path.  
On the other hand, some companies play special role in particular countries, such as the state-owned 
and state-controlled companies in China.55 These kinds of companies always take a lot of burdens even 
for non-commercial objectives for the government such as social services, providing jobs and so on 
because of the weakness in the area of social welfare.56 To control these firms, the country will limit the 
significance of stock market and emphasize the importance of banks in monitoring them, so that the path 
of ‘insider’ system is maintained.57  
So, one corporate system only could be modified on the basis of the original model instead of being 
reformed to another one.   
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4.5  Complementarities---corporate governance works under an economic 
framework, not just by itself 
It is no denying that the corporate governance is one of elements in economic system, so, there are 
relevant complementarities which fit together to exert its efficiency.58  
When a corporate governance regime is chose, relevant complementarities such as institutions, 
practices and professional communities are developed to assist it. 59  When the system of 
complementarities formed, which corporate governance system is efficient in this country is affected by 
the complementarities as well. So, the existing corporate governance system is likely to persist even if it 
is no longer efficient in the new circumstances considering the huge reforming costs of restructuring the 
complementarities.60  
Provided the close relationship between the core elements of the corporate governance system with 
other economic and legal elements, the intention to change the corporate governance system essentially 
has to involve reconstructing other systems.61 For example, aim to reform the corporate governance, 
relevant laws not only corporate law but also labor law, financial regulatory law and tax law should be 
rewritten which is really difficult to implement.62  
Suppose that one ‘best model’ is accepted by a country without considering the social, ideological, 
economic, historical, cultural conditions of current system, it will be useless because of the unsuitability 
of every aspects of the framework.63 So, the result of that may make the country’s firms perform worse. 
As Schmidt and Spindler’s opinion ‘introducing elements of the outsider system into the insider system 
may reduce the later’s value, vice versa’64.  
 
4.6  Political issues----the essential reason that the convergence be prevented 
In Milhaupt’s opinion, ‘different national polities differ in the degree to which they retain authority over 
the firm.’65 Because of the leader of the country is government, meanwhile, it is who offer relevant 
foundations for firms. So, the government plays a big role in the corporate governance system.  
If the governmental influence is strong, the private property rights might be less secure, so that more 
concentrated ownership would appear in the system.66 However, if the political players just have limited 
authority over firms, the market and other institutions will provide external governance, so that the 
ownership is more dispersed.67  
The most special example is China where the government has considerable ownership of firms and 
great power to guide corporate development. Because of the regime is constructed under social 
democracy according to which the aim of the economy is to bring benefit to the dumb millions. 
Therefore, the government would not eliminate the domination of those state-owned or state-controlled 
firms in economy. So, the corporate ownership keeps concentrated. Meanwhile, the host of China is 
citizens, so the board would develop toward the co-determination structure which solves the conflict 
between capitals and labors well.68  
To sum up, the internal elements of this system affected each other to maximize the efficiency, so that 
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specific path formed. Meanwhile, relevant laws, practices and institutions were produced to assist the 
core elements of this system. Therefore, it is impossible to change corporate governance system itself. 
However, reformation of the whole framework might be too expensive to do. Even if the costs are less, 
considering the equally efficiency of existing systems, the country prefer to persist current system.69 
Then, the convergence becomes undesirable.  
 
5.  THE CONTROLLERS WOULD RESTRICT THE HARMONIZATION IN 
PURSUIT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS 
 
In different systems, the groups which control firms are different too. In ‘outsider’ system, the control 
and ownership are separated, so that the managers are in charge of the companies while public 
shareholders own them.70 In contrast, although there are managers in the ‘insider’ system, indeed, the 
controllers are the large shareholders who have enough power over managers through exercise voting 
rights in the shareholders’ general meetings.71  
As what talked above, existing systems have equally efficiency after offset of costs and benefits. So 
that, current controllers prefer to persist incumbent systems through which they can keep enjoying the 
controlling power.72 In fact, it is the intention of controllers to maintain their private value. Imaging that 
who will give up the superior position when he cannot be put in a better position? For example, in 
‘insider’ system, large shareholders utilize the controlling position to divert a disproportionate benefit 
against minority shareholders.73 Would they provide better protection or change the ownership to which 
in favor of minority shareholders? The answer is absolutely ‘no’. They will avoid any change toward 
‘outsider’ system, just through keeping shares in hand.74 Meanwhile, those controllers would retain or 
expand relevant rules which favor themselves.75 Take ‘outsider’ system for example, the powerful 
managers would support rules which can avoid formation of large shareholders, such as antitakeover 
rules and rules which discourage the ownership of blocks by financial institutions.76 Through these rules, 
professional managers can maintain their positions.  
From the analysis above, existing controllers would refuse convergence of corporate governance 
system in the purpose of maintaining their private benefits.   
 
6.  COULD A ‘BEST MODEL’ BE BUILT WITH BOTH SYSTEMS’ 
ADVANTAGES? 
 
The proponents of harmonization of corporate governance system may argue that if there is no better one 
between existing systems, diligence can be done to produce one system which is superior to both.  
In the process of harmonization, some good elements of one system should be attached by the other. 
Considering problems of path dependence and complementarities, the problem of inefficiency may arise 
because that the good elements of one system do not fit well with other elements of the system which 
accept them.77 In other words, the advantages of each system are relative to the framework they work in. 
As Schmidt and Spindler stated, ‘…a middle-of-the-road model is not recommended from an economic 
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perspective. It would not necessarily improve the British corporate governance system if important 
elements were introduced into it which observers, regulators or legislators find useful in the German 
system, and vice versa.’78 Meanwhile, every system has advantages and disadvantages, and they go hand 
in hand. To draw the advantages of both systems is impossible. 
Moreover, it is visible that objectives of each country are different essentially. The corporate 
governance in the U.S. is to maximize shareholders’ interests, however, Germany corporate governance 
aims to improve national interests and Japan wants to make good the social benefits in all79. In practice, 
these objectives are separately emphasized in different systems.80 And some modes under different 
systems are antipathic. So, how could one system satisfy all the objectives and balance the interests 
between groups all together?  
In the end, the attention should be paid on the basis of above argument which is constructed without 
concern on the discrepancy of economic development status in different countries. However, in practice, 
because of the different size of economy and different levels of economic development, the system 
which is suitable for countries are different. The best example is differences between developed and 
developing countries. Compared with developed countries, developing countries have smaller firms and 
less capital to afford fierce competition in the market, so that the liquid market cannot be in the central 
position of corporate governance.81  
Provided some unchangeable differences of corporate governance systems in different countries, it is 
clear that no single system can solve all the problems perfectly. Schmidt and Spindler give a reasonable 
conclusion to the controversy between harmonization and competition, ‘…as long as complements are 
deep and strong, and as long as one could not change one institution without changing another, change 
can be harder than a simple smooth evolution to a standardized efficiency.’82 So, it is better to leave 
countries improving their corporate governance in competition instead of harmonizing different systems 
into one.  
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
Corporate governance system is of great importance in the performance of corporations through 
connection the interests of investors and managers. The efficiency of the corporate governance 
determines whether the value of firms can be improved. According to this, every country is finding the 
suitable model which can improve the performance of corporations efficiently. During this process, two 
models formed: the ‘outsider’ system and the ‘insider’ system. Both systems have advantages and 
disadvantages. Nowadays, forces from globalization and development of international market make 
countries and institutions intend to harmonize the world corporate governance system, and several 
actions toward this have been done. However, the essential convergence of the world systems is 
impossible. This paper has analyzed several achievements following the intention of convergence from 
an objective perspective, meanwhile, pointed out several critical concerns for harmonization and argued 
why harmonization cannot be achieved base on analysis of each point.  
In sum, considering the failure of efforts of EU to end differences of corporate governance systems, it 
is clear that a system is shaped not only by the rationality itself, but also by the particular economic 
framework which is composed of historical, cultural, political and legal systems. So, the efficiency of 
each system is relative. The world corporate governance systems would not be harmonized substantially 
unless all the elements in the framework are unified which is incogitable by far. Therefore, countries 
should be left in competition to improve relevant elements or inquire the systems which are efficient to 
them rather than run under the uniform form.  
                                                        
78 Ibid, p122. 
79 Supra note3, p180. 
80 Ibid, p204.  
81 Supra note31, p110. 
82 Supra note58, p18.  
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